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Introduction 
 
The Czech accession to the EU will bring about – with small exceptions – its full 
involvement in the decision-making processes and an adequate representation in the 
principal Union institutions. Already upon signing the Treaty of Accession, the Czech 
Republic will be entitled to participate in the meetings of EU bodies as an observer 
without voting rights. To be able to get involved in an everyday life of the Union, the 
Czech Republic will have to create structures capable of formulating and enforcing 
Czech interests. 
 
These structures should be: 
• Efficient, to prevent the fragmentation of positions leading to their difficult 
enforceability 
• Transparent, to be able to derive clear political consequences arising from 
possible mistakes 
 
The aim of this paper is a deliberation over two fundamental questions: 
What models for formulation of positions decided at the EU level can be envisaged, 
with a view of maintaining the two basic structural presumptions (effectiveness and 
transparency)? 
What will be the control of these mechanisms, including the role of the Parliament? 
 
Due to its limited scope, the paper will focus only on the formulation and co-
ordination of the European policy at the national level, thus on the enforcement of 
Czech interests in the Council. The decision-making processes in other Union 
institutions – in the Commission, in the European Parliament and in the Court of 
Justice are autonomous questions and will not be treated here.  
Another problem arising with this study is the fact that some of the premises it builds 
on (e.g. the functioning of the Council, the question of EU presidency, the 
relationship between the Council and the Commission) will most probably be subject 
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to substantial changes in the forthcoming year as a result of the European 
Convention deliberations and subsequent IGC. It is therefore necessary to closely 
follow the progress of the Convention and prepare for the adoption of possible 
institutional changes. In any case, the new (Constitutional) treaty will not be signed 
before the end of 2003, thus meaning that the Czech Republic will join the EU under 
the institutional framework provided for by the Treaty of Nice.  
 
Current state 
 
At the moment the Czech Republic is not a member state of the EU and hence it 
does not have all the necessary structures. The issues of relations with the EU focus 
on the negotiation of the accession conditions and the implementation of the 
European legislation. In other words, it means ensuring the compatibility of the Czech 
legislation with the acquis. These tasks are tackled by a few key institutions. The 
most important of these are: 
 
• Government Council for European Integration, established on basis of the 
Government decision 1161 of 7 November 2001, Government Working 
Committee for European Integration and the European Integration Department of 
the Office of Government  
 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Section of the State Secretary for European 
Integration (Department of Co-ordination of Relations with the EU, Department of 
EU Communication Strategy and Department of the Countries of the EU and 
Western Europe), including the Permanent Mission to the European Communities 
 
• Department of Compatibility with EU legislation at the Office of Government  
 
Apart from this, other institutions have a stake in these processes as well, for 
example Ministry for Regional Development (steering body for the framework 
Community support) or the Foreign Aid Centre of the Ministry of Finance (steering 
body for the pre-accession EU instruments).  
 
Changes arising from the Czech accession to the EU 
 
The EU accession will have a major impact on the formulation of European policy of 
the Czech Republic. The country will actively participate at the decisions taken in 
Brussels. This will bring about some major structural changes: 
 
Participation of Czech representatives in the Council at the level of ministers or their 
delegates. The ministers of EU member states will decide on issues that will bind the 
Czech Republic as a member country but in some other cases also other entities 
(Czech authorities applying the acquis, possibly also natural and legal persons in 
case of regulations). The ministers will directly participate in the Union legislative 
process which will become (in case of regulations) an integral part of Czech 
legislative order but even in case of other forms of legislation (directives, decisions) 
will have far-reaching consequences for the country. 
 
Transformation of the Permanent Mission to the European Communities to the 
Permanent Representation to the EU. The permanent representation will play a key 
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role in terms of participating at the sessions of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) in Brussels. Our diplomatic mission will pre-negotiate 
the agenda of the Council of Ministers and co-ordinate the positions with those of 
other member states. This will require strengthening of the current mission as well as 
its effective line-up to the decision-making chains formulating the Czech positions for 
the Council (see further), as well as the permanent representations of other member 
states and active communication with them.  
 
The Council will also meet at a lower level of specialized committees and ad hoc 
working groups consisting of the representatives of public authorities of the member 
states. The negotiations at this level will be very important as many decisions will be 
taken already at this stage with the consequent formal approval of the COREPER 
and the Council. This will increase the requirements imposed on the negotiating and 
language capabilities of the Czech officials that will take part in these negotiations. 
Even though the Council meetings are interpreted into the official languages of the 
Union, one must not forget that many important decisions are taken at an informal 
level (breaks, working lunches and dinners etc.). 
 
This raises some basic questions: 
 
Who will represent the Czech Republic at the Council sessions? Will this 
representation differ when the Council will meet in the legislative and executive 
formations? What mechanisms will be chosen for formulating the Czech positions for 
Council negotiations? Who will be responsible for the overall administration of the 
“European” agenda?  
Let us now explore these questions and suggest possible solutions. 
 
The Council at the level of ministers meets in different formations according to the 
scope of the questions discussed. Apart from that, it basically acts in two functions – 
as a legislative body provided that it rules on the proposals of the legislative acts, or 
as an executive body if it rules on other, non-legislative matters. At the moment, 
several so-called sectoral Council formations exist (e.g. Justice and Home Affairs 
Council, ECOFIN Council for Financial and Economic Issues, Environment Council 
etc.). A privileged position among the Council formations is conferred to the so called 
General Affairs Council (GAC) dealing with issues that involve several departments 
(e.g. internal market, transport and environment) and consists of the ministers of 
foreign affairs of the member states. At the Seville European Council, it was decided 
that the GAC will be further divided into the External Relations Council and the 
Council for horizontal issues where the member states usually delegate ministers or 
state secretaries for European affairs. Formally, however, each country decides who 
will represent its government. 
 
It can be assumed that in the individual Council formations the Czech Republic will 
be represented directly by ministers. At the same time, however, we must take into 
account the current discussion on the Council reform. The Convention will also deal 
with the limitation of Council sectoral formations. This is because sectoral Councils 
hardly ever decide on issues that fall within the competence of one single 
department. As a result of this, the decision of a minister committing the government 
as a whole and leading to an unjustified preference of his department can be easily 
challenged. Other proposals focus on the division of the Council into the legislative 
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and executive formations (at present, the Council always acts in both functions). 
Especially where the legislative issues are at stake, there is absolutely no control 
over the negotiation and possible voting of the representatives as the Council meets 
behind closed doors. It is thus possible and plausible that legislative and executive 
functions will be separated, the former being public. In this way, national control over 
the voting of government representatives will be fostered.  
 
The first alternative thus means that the Czech Republic will copy the current practice 
of the member states. It will delegate the representatives of the individual 
departments (i.e. ministers) or their deputies. In the General Affairs Council, the 
country will be represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
 
An alternative could be the creation of the post of a permanent European minister 
(Minister for European Affairs). This minister would be charged with representing the 
Czech Republic in the Council and chairing the committee deciding on national 
positions (see further). He or she would not be charged with chairing any ministry. 
His or her task would be only to “execute” the will of the government in compliance 
with the mandate conferred to him/her. It is possible that this will become a common 
practice in other countries especially due to the current state of debate and upon the 
separation of the legislative Council. 
 
The advantage of this system is that the Minister for European Affairs could 
participate in the continuously ongoing meetings of the Council (especially in case of 
Council formations meeting more frequently, like the GAC of ECOFIN Councils). This 
minister would become quite familiar with the EU milieu and the negotiation tactics 
that he will need during his deployment. He would also ensure an external continuity 
of articulating the Czech positions.  
 
This would, however, mean that he would have to travel continuously between 
Prague and Brussels. Another disadvantage would be the minister´s insufficient 
expertise in the sectoral questions – this could prevent him from reacting operatively 
to counter-proposals of his colleagues. This could be eliminated by inviting ad hoc 
experts from individual ministries which is already a usual practice. He could also be 
assisted by experts from the Permanent Representation.  
 
Another possibility is charging the State Secretary for European Affairs with 
representing the Czech Republic. He would be – unlike the Minister for European 
Affairs – administratively subordinated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This would 
decrease his accountability to the Government as such. It would be worth considering 
whether he could be a sort of junior minister, responsible for issues concerned with 
the Council rulings, having the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Office of 
Government at his disposal, and working at the same time under the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. This regulation would probably require an adoption of a special act of 
parliament.  
 
How to formulate Czech positions? 
 
The model of co-ordination of EU matters is in most of the member states divided 
between political and administrative levels. In most of the member states these two 
levels are also inter-connected, for the high state officials cannot decide on important 
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EU-related issues unless they receive a political mandate. The political co-ordination 
is closely linked to the distribution of political power in the country whereas the 
mutual co-operation of parties in power and non-governmental political parties 
represented in the parliament exists.  
It seems improbable that after the accession, due to the complexity of issues 
discussed in Brussels and an enormous increase of agenda, only the Government 
Council for European Integration (at the moment, it meets monthly while the 
COREPER in Brussels meets every week). On the other hand, due to the scope of 
agenda it is not possible that all the issues will be dealt with directly by the 
Government. In many cases the questions will be so technical that having them on 
the Government agenda would not make much sense (e.g. European environmental 
legislation, food safety, transport, etc.) 
 
The decision-making should thus be structured at two levels: 
 
In a special body (let us call it, for instance, EU Committee) that will meet at the level 
of high state officials of the ministries concerned. These officials would be either state 
secretaries of the individual departments or the deputies responsible for a given 
issue. This should be enabled by the State Administration Act that will come to force 
upon the EU accession.  
 
Due to the inter-departmental nature of the EU Committee it is suitable that it be 
presided by the Minister for European Affairs or the State Secretary for European 
Integration. In case of a Minister and therefore the member of Cabinet, he would 
have at his disposal a Secretariat that would be formed by the transformation of the 
current European Integration Department of the Office of Government (see further). 
In case of the State Secretary, this task could be performed by the Department of Co-
ordination of Relations with the EU (OKEU). In any case, it would be more suitable 
that the State Secretary be responsible directly to the Government, not to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. The question is whether this would be possible under current 
legislation. This is due to the fact that agenda of this State Secretary will not be so 
much a matter of foreign policy with a strong inter-departmental scope.  
 
The EU Committee will also issue internal instructions to individual officials that would 
participate in the preliminary negotiations in the Council working groups in Brussels. 
Here it is difficult to suggest a uniform system – for some issues it would be advisable 
to leave more discretion to the officials and formulate the instructions very generally. 
Other times it might be necessary to formulate these more precisely. The time factor 
is important, too – sometimes the positions must be formulated very quickly making it 
impossible to ensure that the decision is made at the highest appropriate level. Even 
the practice of current member states is not uniform – some countries (like Italy or 
Belgium) prefer to leave more discretion to their officials, while others (like France) do 
not attach too much attention to the working group conclusions and leave the key 
decisions to the ministerial level.  
 
If the EU Committee does not reach a consensus on a common position, the issue at 
stake will have to be decided directly by the Government. The Government should, 
however, in any case retain the right of attraction – i.e. the right to intervene at any 
time and rule on any question if it deems appropriate. The question is how to assure 
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the monitoring of the EU Committee work. Here, the key role will be performed by the 
body administering the European agenda.  
 
Administration and Co-ordination of the European Agenda 
 
The EU Committee will need an administrative apparatus so that it can negotiate all 
the EU-related questions in time and that would be capable of supplying all the 
“dossiers” for the agenda, especially the legislative proposals of the European 
Commission.  
In view of this, several models of co-ordination of the European agenda can be 
considered.  
 
The first model supposes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be after the 
accession, on basis of an amendment to the Competence Act, entitled to administer 
the co-ordination, information and administrative agenda in relation to the EU. The 
ministry (the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the State Secretary for European 
Integration) will co-operate closely with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, other 
departments, the Parliament and the Permanent Representation in Brussels. This 
option is the least demanding from both the human resources and financial allocation 
perspectives for it would require only the development of the status quo. On basis of 
the Government decision of 13 December 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Vice-Premier who is acting also as the Executive Vice-chairman of the Government 
Council for European Integration, was entrusted with the overall co-ordination of the 
integration process. A separate department for the co-ordination of relations with the 
EU has existed since 1999.  
 
The question is how the whole issue would be tackled if the co-ordination and 
steering of European affairs is conferred to a special Foreign ministry department 
headed by the State Secretary who will be obliged to refer directly to the Prime 
minister in case of inter-departmental collisions. What would then be the role of a 
foreign minister to whom the State secretary is administratively subordinated?  
Apart from that, it is necessary to bear in mind that the EU-related issues will not be a 
purely foreign agenda but a part of an everyday internal policy. From this perspective, 
it might seem more appropriate that the co-ordination body is placed outside the 
Foreign ministry structures. 
 
Another alternative is that the aforesaid task will be conferred to the Office of 
Government. This role will be incorporated in the Competence Act again. For this 
purpose, the Office of Government will set up a special department (e.g. Secretariat 
for European Affairs or Office for European Affairs) directly steered by the Prime 
Minister that will co-operate with other departments, the Parliament and possibly the 
Permanent Representation. This model exists in some of the member states (e.g. 
European Secretariat of the Cabinet in the UK, Chancellor´s Office in Germany, EU 
Government Secretariat in Finland etc.). This body will best fulfil the task described. 
Another advantage is its direct connection to the Cabinet. The Foreign Ministry will be 
further charged with the competencies in foreign policy domains (e.g. bilateral 
relations with EU countries, Common Foreign and Security Policy etc.). The current 
European Integration Department at the Office of Government is, however, far 
smaller than the State Secretary Section of the Foreign Ministry. Thus, some 
adjustments in this respect might be needed. A possible problem that might arise 
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here is that some of the experts will not be ready to leave their ministries and shift to 
a different position. This concerns especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that at the 
moment has the highest number of EU experts who might not be ready to leave the 
perspective of a diplomatic career.  
 
It is also possible to consider the creation of a new Ministry for European Affairs that 
will be entrusted with undertaking all the required co-ordination, information and 
administrational tasks. Again, it is necessary to amend the current Competence Act. 
Some of the member states as well as candidate countries have already set up such 
an authority or consider establishing it. This alternative would, however, mean 
substantial re-allocation of financial resources and is also time demanding. Its 
indisputable advantage will consist in the overall administration of the agenda arising 
from EU membership, including the responsibility for the implementation of EU 
legislation, training in European matters, public relations and the control of financial 
flows from EU funds. This would, however, bring about large interventions in the 
individual ministries´ and other central authorities´ competencies. The steering of EU 
agenda would be on the other hand very efficient and transparent. The problem 
encountered in some of the member states is that the minister for European affairs is 
usually the so-called junior member of Cabinet that makes it more difficult to enforce 
his positions in the Government. 
 
The models considered also can be combined in a way that the European Secretariat 
of the Office of Government will work under the Minister for European Affairs (hence 
not under the Prime minister directly). This minister would not direct any special 
department (ministry), only the Secretariat. At the same time he would ensure its 
liaison to the political sphere. He would closely co-operate with the Foreign Ministry 
that will be responsible for the communication flow with the Permanent 
Representation, as well as for bilateral relations with EU countries and other EU 
foreign policy issues. It will be necessary to make sure that there is no duplicity of 
competencies between this body and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Control of European policy by the Parliament  
 
The question of how the Government or individual ministers will be controlled by the 
Parliament must be perceived with two considerations. Firstly, the national 
parliaments still do not have any formal competence at the EU level. Furthermore, a 
large portion of legislation approved in Brussels is by nature implementing, thus 
falling within the competence of the Government and individual ministries, being so 
technical that it is unlikely that the Parliament would deal with it.  On the other hand, 
we must consider this matter in relation to the ongoing Convention deliberations. The 
outcomes of the working groups on Subsidiarity and National parliaments indicate 
that the national parliaments could be vested with some formal powers at EU level. 
This could lead to exerting more pressure on the governments and more vigorous 
control of their European policies including the voting in the Council. If the sessions of 
ministers become public, the parliaments can get yet another lever how to control the 
ministers during their Brussels meetings.  
 
At the moment, the only provision that regulates the relationship between the 
Parliament and the Government in the European issues is Article 10b of the 
Constitution that was incorporated with the so-called “Euro-amendment” whose aim 
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is to provide grounds for the complex preparation for EU membership. This article 
reads:  
 
(1) The Government regularly and in advance informs the Parliament on the 
questions related to the obligations arising from the membership in international 
organisation or institution referred to in Art. 10a (understand EU) 
(2) The chambers of Parliament pronounce on the prepared decisions of such 
international organisation or institution in a way set forth by their respective rules 
of procedure. 
(3) Act on the Contact and Proceedings of Chambers between them as well as in 
relation to third parties can confer the execution of the competence of Chambers 
provided for in paragraph 2 to a joint body of Chambers.  
 
It is evident that the regulation set forth in the Euro-amendment of the Constitution is 
too vague and enables quite an extensive and diverging interpretation. Firstly, it is 
not clear what is meant by the obligations arising from the EU membership. An 
extensive interpretation would enable one to understand this as informing on all the 
prepared legislation as well as on the decisions of an executive nature. On the other 
hand, many acts taken at the EU-level are self-executing (all the regulations, majority 
of decisions etc.), not requiring any further implementation by the national legislation. 
Even if the acts are not self-executing (like e.g. the directives), they are usually 
transposed to the national law by secondary legislation in the form of government 
regulations or ministerial decrees.  
 
This implies that the consultations with the parliament should concern such decisions 
of a fundamental nature like the issues discussed at the EU summits or questions of 
the current Second and Third pillar (i.e. the Foreign and Defence Policy or Judicial 
and Police Co-operation in criminal matters). Most of the decisions are of a technical 
nature and the members of Parliament do not have sufficient expertise to rule on 
them.  
 
Another question is the frequency of briefing the Parliament. The regularity can mean 
informing once a year (e.g. on the legislative programme of the Commission or the 
strategic goals of the Council presidency), but also prior to every Council session. 
The practice of the current member states is not uniform. The fact is that the majority 
of the national parliaments is rather passive in relation to European issues and 
leaves the initiative up to the governments. If any control exists, it is ex post rather 
than ex ante control. The only notable exception is the Danish Folketing whose 
European committee regularly meets with the Danish representatives in the Council 
(every Friday). The ministers concerned inform its deputies on the positions of their 
departments or the government for the Council meeting and in some cases it confers 
the mandate directly to the ministers. 
 
This model does not seem to be very convenient for the Czech Republic. From the 
point of view of effectiveness of the representation of Czech interests in the Union it 
would be better if the briefing of deputies and senators concerns only fundamental 
questions that the Parliament will have to rule on anyway. These are, for instance, 
the intended amendments of the founding treaties requiring the parliamentary 
ratification in the member states (or association agreements), the IGC decisions, 
decisions on deployment of the EU Rapid Reaction Force, etc. As for paragraph 3 of 
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the cited provision of the Constitution, we can only say that it would be more efficient 
that the Government inform the Chamber of Deputies and Senate together. 
Therefore, a joint body for this purpose should be set up as it cannot be realistically 
expected that the two chambers would meet very often in a joint session. 
 
The vagueness of the quoted article of the Constitution requires that an implementing 
act of Parliament be adopted by amending the Rules of Procedure of both chambers 
and apart from that by an act defining more precisely the Government – Parliament 
relation in the EU questions. Even here, however, we have to bear in mind that the 
position of national parliaments will plausibly change with the upcoming IGC that 
might confer upon them new powers at the EU level. For instance, with the ex ante 
control of the subsidiarity principle, the parliaments will be entitled to ask the 
Commission to review its legislative proposals. If they consider them to be in breach 
of this principle they will have the right to nullity those acts of EU institutions that 
came already into force, or they will participate in the election of a future EU 
president. It is necessary that the Parliament closely follow this debate so that it can 
adopt a relevant legislation in time.  
 
Recommendations:  
 
• The Czech Republic must develop such a mechanism of dealing with issues 
discussed at the EU level which will enableit to formulate acceptable positions 
and where possible failures will point to a clear political accountability. 
 
• The formulation of Czech positions on questions decided in the Council should be 
conferred to the EU Committee replacing the current Government Council for 
European Integration. The Committee should meet at the level of state secretaries 
of concerned departments. In case that an agreement on a position cannot be 
reached, it is the Cabinet that will decide. 
 
• A function of the Minister for European Affairs should be created. The minister will 
preside over the sessions of the EU Committee and would possibly represent the 
Czech Republic in the Council, especially if its legislative and executive 
formations are separated. The minister would be the member of Cabinet (which 
would enhance the consistency of Czech EU policy) and to him it shall be 
accountable.  
 
• The co-ordination of the European agenda would be conferred to the European 
Secretariat of the Office of Government. It would convene the meetings of the EU 
Committee upon the instruction of the Minister for European Affairs, prepare the 
agenda on the basis of the individual dossiers discussed in the Council and 
prepare all the necessary materials for the Committee members. 
 
• Due to the pre-negotiation of the positions in the COREPER it is necessary to 
strengthen the Czech Permanent Representation in Brussels and ensure its 
effective liaison with the European Secretariat. This should be done through the 
EU Co-ordination Department of the Foreign Ministry, including the information on 
the positions of other member states and other stakeholders towards issues 
concerned.  
 
 9
 10
• It is necessary to strengthen negotiating and language capabilities of the public 
officials that will take part in the Council working groups. Special training modules 
should be developed in negotiating techniques in co-operation with the Institute 
for Public Administration and certified EU trainers. 
 
• As far as the parliamentary control is concerned, it is indispensable to adopt an 
implementing act to Article 10b of the Constitution that will define more precisely 
in what issues and with what frequency the Government shall consult the 
Parliament with regard to the EU agenda. This briefing should be automatically 
mandatory in those cases where a subsequent assent of the parliament will be 
required (e.g. treaties negotiated at the EU level, directives that need 
implementing parliamentary legislation, etc.). In connection with this, the rules of 
procedure of both chambers must be amended respectively.  
 
 
